And as often happens, the experts' concerns were
entirely confirmed. The corporate wars over metals facilities can be
viewed as a holdover from the wild 1990s, but the conflicts
surrounding Gazprom and Rosneft, which exceeded the bounds of
decency, and Alfa Group are typical consequences of the policy of
"endless redistribution" launched in the summer of 2003.
The Alfa Group conflict doesn't yet appear
particularly worrisome. A document circulated last week outlining
the criminal case ostensibly being built against the business
empire's owners was a fake. The fact that President Vladimir Putin
did not raise the issue of a nearly $1 billion tax claim in his
meeting with the leadership of TNK-BP last week provides some cause
for optimism.
The idea of nationalizing the "Russian" half of the
joint venture between BP and Tyumen Oil without affecting the
"British" half also appears to be a red herring concocted by Alfa's
opponents. I was told, however, that back in March someone suggested
bringing world-renowned economists, including Nobel laureates, to
the Kremlin in order to assess the cost of "fairly" deprivatizing
Russia's largest companies. Nothing came of this suggestion, but the
notion of a sweeping review of the results of privatization is
obviously still alive and kicking.
Unfortunately, even minor political problems can
have major repercussions for Russia's largest companies. At the very
start of the Yukos affair, the company's top executives complained
that the state's attack on the owners of Yukos was leading rapidly
to the disintegration of the company's internal hierarchy. Managers
at all levels began to jump ship, often carting off company assets
or property as they went.
One of the significant differences between
oligarchic conglomerates and state-owned behemoths has been their
comparative resistance to "internal" theft. It turns out that
reversing this process — returning a modern corporation to a
pre-privatization state — takes far less time to accomplish.
Even for the independent observer, however, the
active redistribution of property by modern methods has an upside.
For observers close to the regime and, of course, for journalists on
the take from warring companies, these are the best of times. It's a
nice feeling when you realize that you're as influential and well
informed as Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin and Economic Development
and Trade Minister German Gref. When I watch them talk about Gazprom
and Rosneft, for example, I see myself: someone who is sincerely
interested in the course of events but doesn't know an awful lot or
have any influence.
Or that certain other deputy minister who, judging
by his grave tone, takes the titanic battle between these two
state-owned companies very much to heart. If he were putting that
passion to use by cheering on his favorite soccer team, he'd stand
just as much chance of selling his proposals — even if those
proposals had carried the seal of government decrees.
Konstantin Sonin, a professor at the New Economic
School/CEFIR, wrote this column for Vedomosti.
.gif){kind=spacer}
