The debate about why the Soviet Union
collapsed began the day after it happened. As often happens with
questions like this, however, no clear-cut answer has been found and
probably never will be.
Most people do have a strong opinion on the subject.
Some believe, for example, that the collapse was caused primarily by
increasing disparities in the economy that resulted from extreme
centralization of production and management and the political
leadership's inability to respond to increasingly acute economic
problems. Others contend that the union fell apart as the result of
the subversive activities of spies and agents of influence employed
by our Cold War enemies, the treachery of Mikhail Gorbachev and so
on.
Both groups are so sure they're right that they
don't even argue any longer. The question of what led to the
collapse of the Soviet Union now gives rise to heated debates only
among professional political scientists. But the question is not as
academic as it might seem at first glance. To understand why,
consider a purely economic event that took place last week --
Gazprom's acquisition of Sibneft.
Your assessment of the Sibneft deal -- as well as of
state-owned Rosneft's acquisition of Yuganskneftegaz, state-owned
Unified Energy Systems' planned purchase of a large stake in Power
Machines and the possible acquisition of Norilsk Nickel by
state-owned diamond giant Alrosa -- will depend to a large extent on
how you explain the downfall of the Soviet Union. If spies, Star
Wars and geopolitical forces were to blame, then everything's fine.
But if the main reason for the collapse was
economic, then we're in trouble, because this means that we're
expending our own money and effort to rebuild the very same Soviet
system of industrial organization and management whose
ineffectiveness, so obvious in the final decades of the Soviet era,
led to such regrettable consequences.
If this is the case, all the government's talk about
economic stimulus, private property and transparency that economists
love so much is pure nonsense. In effect, this means that the old
Soviet-era Oil Industry Ministry, Nonferrous Metals Ministry and
Medium Machine-Building Ministry have become the driving forces
behind Russia's new economic policy.
It would have been nice if the authorities had
bothered to tell us that they had set a course -- and not just
economically -- back to the U.S.S.R. Then again, not telling us is
very much in line with the Soviet style of leadership, a haughty
disdain for the governed that seemed to say: It doesn't matter if
you believe us or not, we're still going to do it our way.
Our current leaders are behaving exactly the same
way. Take Gazprom deputy CEO Alexander Ryazanov. When asked about
the Sibneft deal, Ryazanov replied: "If we have the money, why not
buy it?" But a significant portion of the money used to purchase
Sibneft was borrowed from Western banks! And I don't have to remind
you that when the state owns half of a company like Gazprom, it is
liable for half of its debts as well. Meanwhile, top officials have
been making much of the fact that Gazprom paid the market price for
Sibneft.
Now there's something to be proud of. Their
self-satisfaction would make more sense if they'd managed to get
hold of Sibneft for half-price, or even one-third of the market
value. After all, anybody can buy a company for the sticker price.
Konstantin Sonin, professor at the New Economic
School/CEFIR, is a columnist for Vedomosti, where this comment first
appeared.
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