According to some surveys, 77 percent of Russian citizens support the idea of revisiting the results of privatization. It should come as no surprise that the majority of the population favors a redistribution of property, as it simply reflects the fact that the majority is poor, while a minority is very rich. However, any mass asset redistribution aimed at reducing inequality is doomed to failure. At best, Russia will find itself caught in an endless cycle of property redistribution followed by its concentration again.

A decade after economic reforms were launched, most productive assets are concentrated in the hands of a few individuals, the so-called oligarchs. Although the majority of Russians attribute this state of affairs to the flawed privatization process, this is not necessarily the case.

It is only natural that when property rights are poorly protected, control rights over assets become concentrated. Moreover, the larger a single owner's share is, the greater their incentives are to pursue improvements, such as improving corporate governance. Recent cross-country studies show that the worse the general protection and enforcement of property rights are, the greater the concentration of control rights.

Therefore, even if a more "fair" distribution of property, resulting in a more equal distribution of wealth, could be achieved, it would not stay that way for very long.

Dependent courts and corrupt bureaucrats do not allow economic agents to fully enjoy the fruits of their labor unless control rights are highly concentrated.

Unfortunately, we do not have examples of major redistribution of shareholder capital by means of reforms. However, the countries of Latin America do provide a good example of redistribution in the area of land ownership.

In the 20th century, many Latin American countries were drawn into an endless cycle of redistribution. Typically, the poor and unfranchised would put political pressure on the rich elite, e.g., by threatening revolution, as a result of which democratization would take place. As the government became more sensitive to the interests of the median voter (who is inevitably poor in countries with huge asset inequality), reforms were implemented, including redistribution of land from the rich to the poor. Then the rich elite would mount a coup (usually with the active involvement of the military, although they were often relatively bloodless). After the coup, the elite would use its political power to seize property back from the poor (in many instances, the land was returned to pre-reform owners). As time passed, political pressure or the threat of revolution would force the elite to extend the franchise and establish democracy. A left-wing populist would come to power and the cycle start all over again.

For example, Argentina's first elections with universal male suffrage were held in 1912. In 1930, democracy was overthrown by a coup. Elections were held again in 1946 and a coup was mounted in 1955. New elections were held in 1973, democracy fell to a coup in 1976, only to be reinstated in 1983. During that time, the country -- whose per capita GDP had been 80 percent of the United States' in 1946 -- stagnated economically for almost half a century.

Following military coups in Venezuela in 1948, Guatemala in 1954 and Chile in 1973, a significant share of land redistributed by reforms preceding the coups was handed back to the previous owners. In Guatemala, it was the land reform of 1952. In Brazil, the coup of 1964 was mounted after the democratically elected president pushed through agricultural reform paving the way for significant land redistribution.

Although a right-wing military coup seems completely unrealistic in Russia, there is a lesson to be drawn. The threat of forced property redistribution makes the rich spend enormous amounts of money on maintaining their political power. From the standpoint of GDP growth, this is a waste: Both asset redistribution and any activity to oppose redistribution are by definition unproductive activities.

There is no doubt that inequality carries with it substantial costs for the economy. In the long run, the main cost comes from the fact that wealth inequality results in unequal opportunities, and thus capital often does not end up in the hands of those who would employ it most efficiently. In the short run, economic inequality is closely associated with political inequality, which in turn leads to low demand for good market institutions -- such as institutions to protect property rights.

In short, the rich do not have an interest in independent courts or an efficient bureaucracy. Instead, they maintain private systems for protecting their property rights, which in turn jeopardize the property rights of others, and don't give the rich an incentive to demand a high level of property rights protection from the state.

There is one more problem related to inequality: The nature of the redistribution game makes it impossible for the authorities and big business to strike a deal.

Thus, it is conceivable that many rich people today would agree to sacrifice a substantial part of their wealth in return for a guarantee that there would be no further redistribution in the future. Unfortunately, however, the state cannot give such guarantees. And another problem is that the more of his wealth an oligarch sacrifices, the weaker he becomes and the easier it will be demand money from him the next time.

In Latin America, transitions to or from democracy followed by property redistribution happened for the most part in periods of economic recession. In this respect, the recent attack on Russian big business is unusual since the economy is growing at a fast rate.

One might think that nobody needs economic growth in Russia except ordinary citizens, the government and the president -- and that an oligarch is only interested in GDP growth insofar as his own wealth grows with the whole economy.

This logic, however, is flawed. For oligarchs, sustainable growth is much more important, as it protects them from those who would seek to question the legitimacy of their ownership rights. If those voters that favor a new round of property redistribution (77 percent of the electorate, apparently) were represented by a popular left-wing movement or an elected politician (and it cannot be ruled out that President Vladimir Putin could assume such a role), the haves might face awkward questions about how they obtained their property. However, while the economy is growing these questions tend to recede into the background.

In other words, those who think that privatization was conducted unfairly are not that much concerned with those who took the lion's share of the pie, as long as the pie itself is growing.

What can oligarchs do to support economic growth? The first thing they can do is to reduce their spending on unproductive activities -- including the corruption of bureaucrats and courts. However, they face a coordination problem much like the participants in an arms race. It may be beneficial for each oligarch if all oligarchs reduce their investment in the private protection of property rights. However, each of them rationally foresees that once he reduces his investment in private protection, others will respond by increasing theirs, thus making his productive investments less profitable.

Privatization and the subsequent events of the 1990s have resulted in a dramatically uneven distribution of wealth in Russia. There is little doubt that it has had and continues to have a negative effect on economic development. However, a new round of forced redistribution will not improve the situation. Rather, Russia could be drawn into an endless cycle of property redistribution from rich to poor and vice versa. Needless to say, the absence of economic growth for the duration of such a period is a foregone conclusion.

Konstantin Sonin is an assistant professor at the New Economic School and senior economist at CEFIR. This comment first appeared in Vedomosti.