

Topics in Game Theory  
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The course is dealing with some topics in repeated games. The special attention is devoted to the issue of cooperation among the players and to the reputation formation. The course includes 14 lectures. The final grade will be based on the written final exam. Readings will mostly be taken from the list below. The copies of papers will be available in the library. Some papers are likely to be added or dropped as we go. The course will be taught in English.

### **Week 1,2: Introduction to Repeated Games and Folk Theorems**

[1] Fudenberg, D. and J. Tirole "Game Theory", MIT Press, 1996, Ch. 4,5

### **Week 3,4: Cooperation with Imperfect Monitoring and Applications**

[2] Abreu, D. and D. Pearce and E. Stacchetti, "Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring," *Econometrica*, 58, 1990, 1041-1063

[3] Kandori M., "Introduction to Repeated Games with Private Monitoring," *JET*, 102, 2002, 1-15

[4] Ely, J. and J. Valimaki, "A Robust Folk Theorem for the Prisoner's Dilemma," *JET*, 102, 2002, 84-105

[5] Green, E. and Porter R., "Non cooperative Collusion Under Imperfect Price Information," *Econometrica*, 52, 1984, 87-100

### **Week 5,6: Reputation in Repeated Games and Applications**

[6] Fudenberg, D. and D. Levine, "Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player", *Econometrica*, 57, 1989, 759-778

[7] Fudenberg, D. and D. Levine, "Maintaining a Reputation When Strategies are Imperfectly Observed", *Review of Economic Studies*, 59, 1992, 561-579

[8] Mailath, G. and L. Samuelson, "Who Wants a Good Reputation?" *Review of Economic Studies*, 68, 2001, 415-441

[9] Abreu, D. and F. Gul, "Bargaining and Reputation", *Econometrica*, 68, 2000, 85-117

[10] Morris, S., "Political Correctness," *JPE*, 109, 2001, 231-265

### **Week 7: Communication in Infinitely Repeated Games**

[11] Compte O., "Communication in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring," *Econometrica*, 66, 1998, 597-626

[12] Kandori M. and Matsushima H., "Private observation, communication and collusion," *Econometrica*, 66, 1998, 627-652